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RULE 11 AND PAPERS NOT WARRANTED BY LAW
INTRODUCTION
Since its amendment in 1983,1 federal courts have "labored mightily
... to give meaningful content to the dictates of Rule 1 " The Rule has
engendered difficult problems of interpretation and application, problems
made more difficult by a welter of conflicting policies3 and attitudes. An
index of the uncertainty surrounding Rule 11 is not only the huge bibli-
ography it has generated, but the extent to which courts have turned to
scholarly commentary on Rule 11.1 Some of the deepest divisions and
most enduring problems have arisen in the area of sanctions for papers
without legal basis, partly because there is no "bright line" between a
weak legal position and a sanctionably weak position,6 and partly be-
1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, as amended, reads in part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that
the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
2. C. Wright, A. Miller and M. Kane, 5 Federal Practice and Procedure 251 (Supp.
1989). See Shaffer, Introduction to A.B.A. Section of Litigation, Sanctions: Rule Il and
Other Powers 2 (2d ed. 1988).
3. See Untereiner, A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 Yale L.L 901, 901-
02 (1988). Professor Untereiner observes that:
[c]ritics of amended Rule 11 argue that it chills creative advocacy, generates
wasteful satellite litigation, interferes with the attorney-client relationship, sours
relations between opposing counsel and between bench and bar, overdeters par-
ticular types of claimants, and conflicts with the liberal pleading regime of the
Federal Rules. Supporters... contend that it deters much frivolous litigation
(thereby conserving judicial resources), compensates the victims of vexatious
litigation, and educates the bar about appropriate standards of conduct.
Id. (citations omitted).
4. Compare Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aero-
space Workers, Dist. No. 8, 802 F.2d 247, 255 (7th Cir. 1986) (Rule 11 is being and will
continue to be "enforced in this circuit to the hilt.") with Townsend v. Holman Consult-
ing Corp., 881 F.2d 788, 797 (9th Cir. 1989) ("With few exceptions, those affected by the
flood of Rule 11 motions would not object if the next five years brought substantially
fewer.").
5. For example, federal courts have cited Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Fed-
eral Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985), more than 125 times. For other
commonly cited articles, see the list provided by Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479,
482 n.2 (3d Cir. 1987).
6. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 574 (E.D.N.Y.
1986) (claims span the entire continuum, some claims being clearly frivolous, some
clearly nonfrivolous and some difficult to call). The court in Eastway stated:
Attorneys are... placed in a dilemma because they have the ... ethical
obligation.., to present to the court all the nonfrivolous arguments that might
be made on their clients' behalf, even if only barely nonfrivolous. They are
forced by their position as advocates in the legal profession to live close to the
line, wherever the courts may draw it. Yet Rule 11 threatens them with severe
sanctions if they miscalculate ever so slightly the location of that line. As a
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cause it is here that the policies and attitudes of the judiciary conflict
most sharply.7
In formulating standards for judging the legal basis of a paper under
Rule 11,8 federal courts have raised and answered differently three ques-
tions: Must a lawyer cite contrary authority?9 If a lawyer is making an
argument for an extension or modification of existing law, must he iden-
tify his argument as such?' 0 Must the lawyer actually make a reasonable
argument in support of his legal position or is it sufficient that a reason-
able argument could be made?"
result many members of the bar are concerned that Rule 11 will discourage
attorneys from pursuing novel yet meritorious legal theories.
Id. According to Professor Georgene Vairo, "[w]hile many of the cases in which sanc-
tions have been imposed appear to be frivolous, there are many very close cases." Vairo,
Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 217 (1988); see also Snyder, The Chill of
Rule 11, 11 Litigation 16, 55 (Winter 1985) (no bright line between frivolous and nonfriv-
olous). But see Coleman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 791 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir.
1986) (citations omitted):
[Trhe ambiguities that lurk in "frivolous" (or any other word) in marginal cases
do not prevent the imposition of penalties. Uncertainty is a fact of legal life.
The "law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating
rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree."
"Whenever the law draws a line there will be cases very near each other on
opposite sides. The precise course of the line may be uncertain, but no one can
come near it without knowing that he does so, if he thinks, and if he does so it is
familiar to the... law to make him take the risk."
7. There is an inherent conflict between the Advisory Committee's goal of lessening
frivolous claims and motions and its desire not to chill innovative legal arguments and the
law's ability to change. See Advisory Committee Note, 97 F.R.D. 198, 199-201 (1983);
Bloomenstein, Developing Standards for the Imposition of Sanctions Under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 Akron L. Rev. 289, 325 (1988); see also Risinger,
Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some "Striking"Problems with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 57 (1976) ("Today's frivolity may be tomorrow's
law, and the law often grows by an organic process in which a concept is conceived, then
derided as absurd (and clearly not the law) ... then accepted as the law."); Levinson,
Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?, 24 Osgoode Hall L. J. 353,
374-78 (1987) (quoting Risinger); Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-
Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74
Geo. L.I. 1313, 1341 (1986) (same). Other courts, who perceive the flood of litigation as
a threat to the courts' ability to administer justice, are little concerned with "chill" and
more concerned with deterring excess litigation. See International Shipping Co., S.A. v.
Hydra Offshore, Inc., 875 F.2d 388, 393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 563 (1989). It
was also feared that Rule 11 would create satellite litigation. See Advisory Committee
Note, 97 F.R.D. 198, 201 (1983). This problem may also be more acute in the area of
legal arguments, because when the question of sanctions is perceived as close, there are
more likely to be appeals. See Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1017-18
(1988).
8. For the language of Rule 11, see supra note 1.
9. See DeSisto College, Inc. v. Line, 888 F.2d 755, 765 (11th Cir. 1989); Hill v.
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1198 (7th Cir. 1987); Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp.
v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531, 1542 (9th
Cir. 1986), sua sponte request for en banc hearing denied, 809 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1987).
10. SeeDeSisto, 888 F.2d at 766 & n.20 (11th Cir. 1989); Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d
1151, 1154 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 851 (1986); Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 127.
11. See In re Ronco, Inc., 838 F.2d 212, 218 (7th Cir. 1988); Golden Eagle, 103
F.R.D. at 126.
RULE 11
The different answers given to these questions reflect a larger and more
basic disagreement on the purpose, policy, and theory of Rule 11. They
reflect as well some of the difficulties of defining a legally frivolous mo-
tion, pleading or other paper or otherwise defining a violation under the
legal prong of Rule 11. These answers are also influenced by the practi-
cal problems of applying a particular definition of frivolity, that is, of
formulating and applying a test to determine what papers meet the
definition.
Part I of this Note examines the arguments for and against the imposi-
tion of Rule 11 sanctions on the grounds of failure to cite contrary au-
thority, failure to identify an argument as one for the extension or
modification of law, and failure to make a reasonable argument in sup-
port of a paper when one is available. Part II analyzes differing interpre-
tations of the language of Rule 11. Part III discusses the practical
problems in applying the Rule under these interpretations. This Note
concludes that courts should use a two-part test, consisting of, first, a
determination that the paper is unwarranted "by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law,")12 and, second, a determination that the attorney has not made a
reasonable preffling inquiry into the law. This Note also concludes that
Rule 11 sanctions should not be imposed for failure to cite opposing au-
thority, failure to indicate whether an argument is being made under ex-
isting law or for the extension or modification of existing law, or failure
to make a reasonable argument when one exists.
I. STANDARDS FOR THE LEGAL BASIs OF PLEADINGS, MOTIONS
AND OTHER PAPERS
These questions were first litigated in Golden Eagle Distributing Corp.
v. Burroughs Corp. 3 Judge Schwarzer of the District Court for the
Northern District of California, a noted authority on Rule 11,14 sanc-
tioned attorneys for a motion for summary judgment that failed to cite
contrary, though distinguishable, authority"5 and for a brief on choice of
law in which its authors did not indicate that they were arguing for an
extension or modification of existing law.16 The opinion also made it
plain that because at the time of filing the papers the attorneys had failed
to make what the judge considered a reasonable argument in support of
12. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
13. 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986), sua sponte
request for en bane hearing denied, 809 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1987). It has been said of
Golden Eagle that "[p]erhaps no Rule 11 decision is more controversial." Shaffer, supra
note 2, at 17.
14. Judge Schwarzer is the author of Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A
Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985), and Rule 11 Revisited, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1013
(1988), and a well-known proponent of the vigorous use of Rule 11 sanctions. See
Strasser, Sanctions: A Sword Is Sharpened, Nat'l L.., Nov. 11, 1985, at 1, 32.




their position, the fact that a reasonable argument could have been made,
and in fact was later made, was not sufficient to excuse them from
sanctions. 17
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that because the underlying mo-
tion was itself non-frivolous, failure to cite opposing authority or to iden-
tify an argument as one for the extension or modification of law did not
render it sanctionable.'8 The Ninth Circuit also held that Rule 11 was
satisfied if a reasonable argument in support of an attorney's legal posi-
tion existed-it was not necessary that the attorney actually make the
argument.19 Reaction to the reversal ranged from praise20 to condemna-
tion;2' some of the severest criticism came from within the Ninth Circuit
itself.2  Other circuits have split, some rejecting all or part of the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning in Golden Eagle,23 others following at least in part.24
The arguments for and against "argument identification," as the Ninth
17. Id. at 126, 129.
18. Golden Eagle Distr. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540-41 (9th Cir.
1986).
19. Id. at 1541.
20. Professor Georgene Vairo commented: "The Golden Eagle case led to the bar's
great consternation. The line between vigorous advocacy and an attorney's obligation to
the court shifted quite far. The bar need no longer fear Golden Eagle. The Ninth Circuit
has shot it down." Vairo, Structural Changes and Sanctions: An Analysis of the August
1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 89 (ALI-ABA Resource
Materials 1986). For criticism of the district court's opinion, see Nelken, supra note 7, at
1347-50.
21. See Note, Attorney Sanctions-Rule 11-Deterring Unethical Motion and Plead-
ing Practice-Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 36 Kan. L. Rev. 173,
184-87 (1987).
22. See Golden Eagle Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 809 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1987) (Noo-
nan, J., dissenting from denial of sua sponte request for en bane hearing) (joined by four
other Ninth Circuit judges). Judge Noonan later called the Ninth Circuit's approach to
Rule 11 "a straightforward gutting" of the Rule. Townsend v. Holman Consulting
Corp., 881 F.2d 788, 797 (9th Cir. 1989) (Noonan, J., dissenting).
23. The Seventh Circuit has expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in
Golden Eagle and has upheld sanctions on all three grounds. See, e.g., In re Ronco, 838
F.2d 212, 218 (7th Cir. 1988) (requiring that a reasonable argument actually be made);
Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F:2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir.) (sanctions imposed for not identifying
argument as one for the extension or modification of law), erL denied, 479 U.S. 851
(1986); Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1198 (7th Cir. 1987) (upholding
sanctions for the "ostrich-like tactic of pretending that potentially dispositive authority
against a litigant's contention does not exist"). The Second Circuit, revising an earlier
standard under which Rule 11 was violated "where no reasonable argument can be ad-
vanced to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands," Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City
of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985) (emphasis added), cert denied, 484 U.S.
918 (1986), now requires that the reasonable argument actually be made. See Interna-
tional Shipping Co., S.A. v. Hydra Offshore, Inc., 875 F.2d 388, 390 (2d Cir.) (changing
Eastway standard by replacing "can be" with "has been") (citing Norris v. Grosvenor
Marketing, Ltd., 803 F.2d 1281, 1288 (2d Cir. 1986)), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 563 (1989).
24. See Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 861 F.2d 746, 759 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Sanc-
tions should not be imposed where a 'plausible good faith argument can be made .... '"
(quoting Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 833 (9th Cir. 1986))); Mary Ann
Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1988) ("counsel may not be found to
have violated Rule 11 merely for failing to 'label' the argument advanced").
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Circuit dubbed the lower court's requirement that attorneys label an ar-
gument for the extension or modification of law as such,' are based upon
the language of Rule 11, the practical problems of line-drawing, and the
policies behind Rule 11. A broad reading of the Rule finds in the words
"warranted under existing law or by a good faith argument for the exten-
sion, modification, or reversal of existing law" an implicit requirement to
state which argument is being made.2 6 This implicit requirement springs
from the "duty of candor" which Judge Schwarzer and others imported
into Rule 11 from the A.B.A.'s Model Rules of Professional Conduct,27
calling it a "necessary corollary of the certification required by Rule
I L."  According to this view, a duty of candor must exist under Rule
11: without it the Rule does not function to achieve its goal, which Judge
Schwarzer defined as ensuring that the court is "fully informed" so that
it can fairly decide the substantive issues before it.29
The duty of candor thus discovered under Rule 11 is violated by an
argument for the extension of existing law "disguised" as one based on
existing law.3 0 Such an argument "misrepresents existing law."31 It does
not "accurately describe the law and then call for change." 32 Some deci-
sions have held a lack of argument identification to be sanctionable either
as a misrepresentation or as a failure to do a reasonable prefiling inquiry
to ascertain the state of existing law.33 As one decision put it, "Counsel
either are trying to buffalo the court or have not done their
25. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1539 (9th
Cir. 1986).
26. For the text of Rule 11, see supra note 1.
27. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 127-28
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (quoting A.B.A. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 (1983), and
Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-23 (1979)), ree'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th
Cir. 1986).
28. Id. at 127; see also Wojan v. General Motors Corp., 851 F.2d 969, 976 (7th Cir.
1988) (accepting duty of candor under Rule 11); Lyle v. Charlie Brown Flying Club, Inc.,
112 F.R.D. 392, 398 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (Rule I I implies duty of candor), rev'd without
opinion, 822 F.2d 64 (1987); Schwarzer, supra note 5, at 193 (duty of candor a necessary
corollary of Rule 11).
29. See Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 127; Schwarzer, supra note 5, at 193. The
Supreme Court recently spoke of the purpose of Rule I I as deterrence of frivolous or
improper motions. See Pavelic v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456, 460
(1989). The use of Rule I I as a cure-all for all manner of attorney misconduct has been
criticized. See Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829-30 (9th Cir. 1986);
Nelken, supra note 7, at 1351. Other courts, also arguing for a broad application of Rule
11, see a requirement of argument identification as necessary to stem the flood of frivo-
lous claims and defenses. See International Shipping Co. v. Hydra Offshore, Inc., 875
F.2d 388, 393 (2d Cir.) ("The quality of Justice depends upon our ability to control the
flood of litigation."), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 563 (1989).
30. See Golden Eagle, 103 F.R.D. at 127.
31. Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 851
(1986).
32. Id.
33. See, eg., DeSisto College, Inc. v. Line, 888 F.2d 755, 766 (lth Cir. 1989);
Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 126, 129 (N.D. Ca.
1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
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homework."'34
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit, finding no explicit requirement of argu-
ment identification in the language of the Rule,35 has declined to go be-
yond the terms of the Rule to impose one. 6 This narrow reading of Rule
11 also rejects a duty of candor under Rule 11, seeing such ethical con-
siderations as more properly governed by the review procedure estab-
lished by the bar3 7 and as beyond the scope of amended Rule 11. This
scope is defined by the Rule's purpose "to deter the filing of baseless
pleadings and motions, not to punish lawyers for making meritorious ar-
guments in a way that the court deems to exceed the bounds of accepta-
ble advocacy." 38
A narrow reading of Rule 11 has the advantage of removing the diffi-
culty of drawing a line between papers warranted by existing law and
papers warranted by a good faith argument for the extension of law,39
and the consequent closeness of sanctions decisions on this ground.'
Courts have noted that close decisions on argument identification are
likely to result in sanctions based on "the level of assurance used by the
34. Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1082 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1101 (1988).
35. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1539 (9th
Cir. 1986).
36. See id. at 1539-40; Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 96 (3rd Cir.
1988).
37. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d at 1542; Nelken,
supra note 7, at 1350-51. The court in Golden Eagle noted: "The district court's interpre-
tation of Rule 11 requires district courts to judge the ethical propriety of lawyers' con-
duct with respect to every piece of paper filed in federal court. This gives us considerable
pause." Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1539; see also Mary Ann Pensiero, 847 F.2d at 96
(following Golden Eagle in rejecting the "duty of candor").
38. Nelken, supra note 7, at 1351.
39. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540 (9th
Cir. 1986); see also Nelken, supra note 7, at 1350 ("Can anyone determine with precision
when a position has become an argument for the 'extinsion' or 'modification' of existing
law?"); Note, Plausible Pleadings: DevelopingStandardsfor Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 Harv.
L. Rev. 630, 638 (1987) ("Because almost every new claim varies to some degree from
reported decisions, virtually all cases present novel questions not determined by existing
law.").
40. See Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1540. The closeness of sanctions for lack of argu-
ment identification also varies depending on the definition of "existing law" used by the
sanctioning judge. If existing law is defined narrowly as law which has already been
decided, see Schwarzer, supra note 5, at 194, more arguments will come within the ambit
of sanctions. On the other hand, an argument under existing law may be defined to
include arguments where the issue has been left open, unsettled, or uncertain. See, eg.,
In re Ronco, Inc., 838 F.2d 212, 219 (7th Cir. 1988) (no sanctions for argument asserted
by opponent to be unwarranted under existing law, when argument though "weak" was
"not precluded by any existing precedent"); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental
Ill. Corp., 113 F.R.D. 637, 639 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (pleading or motion is warranted by
existing law if it "addresses a question of first impression, or if it concerns an issue on
which the law is unsettled" (quoting Solovy, Wedoff & Bart-Howe, Sanctions Under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 11, at 15 (Oct. 11, 1986))). Under this definition, fewer
arguments will be in the category of arguments for the extension of law and subject to a
requirement of argument identification. The problem for lawyers is understanding in
advance a particular judge's definition of existing law.
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brief-writer,"41 or a lack of sophistication in the brief writer.42 When
mandatory sanctions ride upon close judicial decisions, "[tihe danger of
arbitrariness increases and the probability of uniform enforcement de-
clines."43 The result is a chilling effect on advocacy44 and on the ability
of the law to change.45
Rather than assisting courts, broadly applying Rule 11 with a require-
ment of argument identification saddles the judiciary with the extra bur-
den of "grad[ing] accuracy of advocacy in connection with every piece of
paper filed in federal court"' 46 and "multiplies the decisions which the
court must make."'47 This extra burden defeats Rule 1I's goal of reduc-
ing cost and delay.48 Close decisions on argument identification also re-
sult in appeals and satellite litigation on sanctions issues, again creating
cost and delay.49
Many of the same arguments apply to sanctions for failure to cite con-
trary authority. Both a breach of the duty of candor and a failure to
make a reasonable inquiry that would have disclosed the contrary au-
thority have been urged as a rationale for sanctions. 50
The Ninth Circuit argued that sanctions for failure to cite contrary
authority, when the paper itself was not frivolous," would result in close
41. Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1540 (quoting appellant's brief); see Calloway v. Mar-
vel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1478-79 (2d Cir. 1988) (referring to the sanc-
tioned motion in the Golden Eagle case as "a memorandum... that overstated a legal
argument."), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Pavelic & Leffore v. Marvel Entertainment
Group, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989).
42. See Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1085-86 (7th Cir.
1987) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), cerL dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1101(1988).
43. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1541 (9th Cir.
1989). For expressions of concern about the lack of uniformity in the application of Rule
11, see Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 1015; Vairo, Rule 11:. A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D.
189, 202-03 (1988); A.B.A. Section of Litigation, Standards and Guidelines for Practice
Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 121 F.R.D. 101, 104 (1988).
44. See Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1541; see also id. at 1540 (noting possible "conflict
between the lawyer's duty zealously to represent his client and the lawyer's own interest
in avoiding rebuke") (citation omitted); Strasser, supra note 14, at 32 (quoting statement
in sanctioned firm's brief that the Golden Eagle sanctions would "produce a more sub-
servient, more cautious, even a more timid bar" and "change basic notions of advocacy").
45. See Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1540.
46. Id.; see also Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1085 (7th
Cir. 1987) (Cudahy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("under this approach the
judicial process becomes a task not unlike the grading of law school examinations"), cer
dismissed, 108 S. CL 1101 (1988).
47. Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1540.
48. See Advisory Committee Note, 97 F.R.D. 198, 198 (1983).
49. See Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1541; see also Advisory Committee Note, 97
F.R.D. at 201.
50. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 129 (N.D.
Cal. 1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Note, Attorney Sanctions--Rule
11-Deterring Unethical Motion and Pleading Practice-Golden Eagle Distributing
Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 36 U. Kan. L. Rev. 173, 183, 185 (1987).




questions and burden the court with extra research to make sure papers
submitted by attorneys had not omitted any relevant case. 2 In addition,
it believed that sanctions for failure to cite cases would undermine the
advocacy system by blurring the roles of judge and advocate:
[N]either Rule 11 nor any other rule imposes a requirement that the
lawyer, in addition to advocating the cause of his client, step first into
the shoes of opposing counsel to find all potentially contrary authority,
and finally into the robes of the judge to decide whether the authority
is indeed contrary or whether it is distinguishable. It is not the nature
of our adversary system to require lawyers to demonstrate to the court
that they have exhausted every theory, both for and against their cli-
ent. Nor does that requirement further the interests of the court. It
blurs the role of judge and advocate.5 3
The issues of "argument identification" and failure to cite adverse au-
thority may both be subsumed under the larger question of whether a
lawyer must actually make a reasonable argument in support of his legal
position or whether it is enough that a reasonable argument exists.
Although the district court in Golden Eagle did not address this issue
separately, the Ninth Circuit viewed this as the basic issue and began its
discussion of the case by stating: "The district court did not focus on
whether a sound basis in law and in fact existed for the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment. Indeed it indicated that the motion itself
was nonfrivolous. Rather, the district court looked to the manner in
which the motion was presented."'
Again broad and narrow readings of the language of Rule 11 have
been proposed. The broad reading focuses on the words "warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law""5 and concludes that an argument demonstrat-
ing one or the other must be present for the attorney to escape sanc-
tions.5 6 Another view argues that allowing an attorney to defend an
unsupported motion by demonstrating afterward that a reasonable argu-
ment could have been made defeats Rule 1I's requirement that a reason-
able inquiry be performed before filing.57 According to one court, "[t]he
In rejecting the district court's broad interpretation of Rule 11, we do not sug-
gest that the court is powerless to sanction lawyers who take positions which
cannot be supported. A lawyer should not be able to proceed with impunity in
real or feigned ignorance of authorities which render his argument meritless.
Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1542 (9th Cir. 1986).
52. See id.
53. Id.; see also M. Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System 51 (1975) (a
lawyer should not prejudge a client's case).
54. Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1538 (citation omitted).
55. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
56. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 126, 129
(N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Golden Eagle Distrib.
Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 809 F.2d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 1987) (Noonan, J., dissenting from
denial of sun sponte request for en bane hearing).
57. See International Shipping Co. S.A. v. Hydra Offshore, Inc., 875 F.2d 388, 390
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Rule compels us to focus on counsel's conduct at the time of the
submission.""8
On the other side, it has been argued that the Rule itself focuses on the
existence of a reasonable argument in support of the pleading or motion,
not on the way an argument is framed. Close calls on whether a paper is
sanctionable would result from a requirement that the reasonable argu-
ment actually be made, rather than merely exist, and Rule 11 would be
applied in situations in which an argument "did have some merit" but
the attorney "was not filly aware of that fact at the initial filing."5 9 An
attorney would be subject to sanctions "[a]nytime [he] did not fully flesh
out an argument." 6
In its narrow reading of Rule 11, the Ninth Circuit focused on the
words "pleading, motion, or other paper, ' 61 arguing that Rule 11 does
not require attorneys to certify that individual arguments in support of
pleadings, motions or papers are warranted by law, but only that the
paper itself is warranted.6 2 This argument makes a distinction between
the merits of a paper (possible ground for sanctions) and the manner of
presentation (not a ground for sanctions).63
II. "CONDUCT" VERSUS "PRODUCT"
The issues in the Golden Eagle case have evolved into a debate over
whether Rule 11 should focus on conduct (the prefiling inquiry) or prod-
uct (the substantive merits of the paper filed)." The conduct/product
debate begins with the language of the rule and centers on some of the
(2d Cir.) (calling attorney's assertion that a reasonable argument could have been made
"'post hoe sleight of hand' ") (citing Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
1013, 1022 (1988)), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 563 (1989); Lyle v. Charlie Brown Flying
Club, Inc., 112 F.R.D. 392, 399 (N.D. Ga. 1986), rev'd., 822 F.2d 64 (11th Cir. 1987).
58. Hydra, 875 F.2d at 390. In support of this view, the court in Hydra cited the
Advisory Committee Note, apparently referring to the Committee's statement that the
court "should test the signer's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the
time [of submission]." Advisory Committee Note, 97 F.R.D. 198, 199 (1983); see Hydra
at 390. But this statement was made in contemplation of the opposite situation, where a
position that seemed reasonable at the time of filing turns out to be unwarranted. The
Advisory Committee makes it clear that courts are to "avoid using the wisdom of hind-
sight" in order not to "chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity." Advisory Commit-
tee Note, 97 F.R.D. at 199. The Advisory Committee Note does not support the reverse
proposition that a position which turns out to be warranted should be sanctioned if the
attorney did not adequately investigate before filing.
59. Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 861 F.2d 746, 759 (1st Cir. 1988).
60. Id.
61. For the language of Rule 11, see supra note 1.
62. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1541 (9th
Cir. 1986).
63. See id.; Nelken, supra note 7, at 1351.
64. See, eg., Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 881 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir.
1989) (following narrow reading of Rule 11 focusing on product); Mars Steel Corp. v.
Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Rule 11 focuses on inputs
rather than outputs, conduct rather than result."); Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 1020-25(Rule II should focus on conduct); Rule 11 in Transition: The Report of the Third
1990] RULE 11 1093
FORDRAM L4W REVIEW
changes65 made in the text of the rule in 1983, particularly the implica-
tions of the added phrase "formed after reasonable inquiry."" There has
been relatively little controversy over what constitutes a "reasonable in-
quiry"-the rulemakers were helpful on that point.67 They gave less
help, however, on the question of how the courts should go about apply-
ing Rule 11, and if and to what extent the judges should turn their atten-
tion from the merits of a paper to the prefiling investigation.68 While the
Advisory Committee Note establishes the existence of an affirmative duty
to conduct some preffling inquiry and clearly envisions the courts decid-
ing whether one has taken place,69 it fails to address several important
questions: What is the function of the reasonable inquiry requirement in
the Rule itself, and what is the relationship between the components of
this prong of the rule-the reasonable inquiry, the belief, knowledge and
information, and the legal and factual basis of the paper? Are they sepa-
rate grounds for sanctions, or must a paper fail in all three to be
sanctionable?
A. The Negligence Interpretation of Rule 11
Several decisions have interpreted Rule 11 by analogizing it to negli-
gence.70 This idea was expressed even before the amending of Rule 11 in
Circuit Task Force on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, at 20 (American Judicature
Society 1989) (advocating focus on conduct).
65. The relevant section of the old rule read: "The signature of an attorney consti-
tutes a certificate by him ... that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
there is good ground to support [the pleading]." Amendments to the Rules, 97 F.R.D.
165, 197 (1983). The amended rule reads: "that to the best of his knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry [the pleading, motion or other paper] is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification or reversal of existing law .... ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
66. Commentators have called the addition of the words "formed after reasonable
inquiry" the most significant change made in the 1983 amendments to Rule 11. See 2A J.
Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice, 11.02(3) (1989); Nelken, supra note 7, at
1319. But see Risinger, supra note 7,at 54 n. 181 (citing cases that imposed requirement
of reasonable inquiry under old Rule 11).
67. The Advisory Committee Note states:
The court is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should test
the signer's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the time the
pleading, motion, or other paper was submitted. Thus, what constitutes a rea-
sonable inquiry may depend on such factors as how much time for investigation
was available to the signer;, whether he had to rely on a client for information as
to the facts underlying the pleading, motion, or other paper;, whether the plead-
ing, motion, or other paper was based on a plausible view of the law; or whether
he depended on forwarding counsel or another member of the bar.
Advisory Committee Note, 97 F.R.D. 198, 199 (1983). Judge Easterbrook has suggested
other factors: "In most cases the amount of research into legal questions that is 'reason-
able' depends on whether the issue is central, the stakes of the case, and related matters
that influence whether further investigation is worth the costs." Mars Steel Corp. v.
Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932-33 (7th Cir. 1989).
68. See Advisory Committee Note, 97 F.R.D. at 198 (1983).
69. See id.
70. See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 1988); Continental
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an influential article by Professor Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its
Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 11.71 Although arguing that the subjective standard of former
Rule 11 ("to the best of [the signer's] knowledge, information, and be-
lief"' 72) was not unenforceable, 73 Professor Risinger nevertheless sug-
gested that Rule 11 should perhaps be amended to include an objective
standard, noting that such a standard would in effect "take us from the
realm of ethical consideration to the realm of negligence."74
The effect of this entry into the realm of negligence would be, accord-
ing to Risinger, that Rule 11 would then apply to some people whose
actions were only the result of negligence.' "However," he observed, "it
might better promote the ends of Rule 11 if it also reprobated gross negli-
gence. This standard would encompass actions such as the filing of an
unfounded suit which proper investigation would have revealed was
unfounded, or the assertion of denials or defenses in similar
circumstances." 76
After Rule 11 was amended, the addition of "after reasonable inquiry"
was seen as incorporating the objective standard (and thus a negligence
standard) that Professor Risinger had proposed.77 Decisions then began
making a more explicit equation between negligence and Rule 11, one
decision interpreting Rule 11 as "defin[ing] a new form of legal malprac-
tice."178 Other courts have looked for the elements of negligence-duty,
breach, causation, injury-in the Rule 11 context.79 These courts agree
that Rule 11 imposes a duty to conduct a reasonable prefiling inquiry,
and that a failure to do so is a breach of that duty. 0
There is disagreement, however, on the definition of the injury which
must be caused by the breach of duty. One view defined the injury as the
bringing of a frivolous lawsuit. Under this definition, an attorney who
Air Lines, Inc. v. Group Systems Int'l, 109 F.R.D. 594, 597 (C.D. Cal. 1986); see also
Whittington v. Ohio River Co., 115 F.R.D. 201, 203 n.1 (E.D. Ky. 1987) (Rule 11 re-
quires "causative element") (citing Continental Air Lines, 109 F.R.D. 594).
71. 61 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1976).
72. For the text of old Rule 11, see supra note 64.
73. Risinger, supra note 7, at 60 ("I would suggest that the problem has not been with
the standards but with the enforcers of those standards. There is nothing inherently un-
workable about subjective standards.").
74. Id.
75. Id. at 60 n.193.
76. Id.
77. See Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1986);
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253-54 (2d Cir. 1985), cert
denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
78. Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 1988).
79. See Whittington v. Ohio River Co., 115 F.R.D. 201, 204 (E.D. Ky. 1987); Conti-
nental Air Lines Inc. v. Group Systems Intern., 109 F.R.D. 594, 597 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
According to one court, Rule I I also "recognizes the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." Mars
Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1989).
80. See Hays, 847 F.2d at 418; Wh/ittington, 115 F.R.D. at 204; ContinentalAir Lines,
109 F.R.D. at 597.
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fails to conduct a reasonable inquiry but brings a suit that turns out to be
"well grounded in fact" and "warranted by... law" has not caused an
injury and therefore has not violated Rule 11.81 Another view of injury
under Rule 11 emphasizes the shifting of the burden of research onto the
opposing party by bringing a suit that is inadequately researched. This
injury, it seems, can occur even if there is some substantive merit to the
suit. 2 Thus, in Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank NA.,8" the court
stated, "[A] motion may be sanctionable even though something could
have been said in its behalf. Litigants 'may not pretend that the law
favors their view and impose on the court or their adversaries the burden
of research to uncover the basic rule.' "8
B. The Conduct Approach
Some courts and commentators, while rejecting the analogy of Rule 11
to negligence, 5 still see the reasonable inquiry requirement as the heart
of the rule. 6 Urging a focus on "conduct" rather than "product," they
take the view that a failure to make a reasonable pre-fiing inquiry is in
itself a Rule 11 violation. 7 In accordance with this view, Judge
Schwarzer paraphrases Rule 11 as "requiring lawyers to certify that they
have made a reasonable inquiry prior to filing the paper to satisfy them-
selves that it is supported by fact and law."8" This paraphrase trans-
81. ContinentalAir Lines, 109 F.R.D. at 596; see also Whittington, 115 F.R.D. at 203
n.1.
82. See Mars Steel, 880 F.2d at 939 (opposing party "dodged a bullet" when sanc-
tioned party brought inadequately argued motion); Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d
412,419 (7th Cir. 1988) ("meritorious though modest" claim sanctioned along with "un-
equivocally frivolous" claims, because the suit "had not been pursued effectively"). But
see Elson & Rothschild, Rule 11: Objectivity and Competence, in 5 C. Wright, A. Miller
& M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 241, 248 (Supp. 1989) (client, not opposing
party, is principal victim and Rule 11 does nothing for him).
83. 880 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1989).
84. Id. at 938 (quoting In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1073 (7th Cir.
1987)) (citations omitted). But see Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Group Systems Int'l,
109 F.R.D. 594, 597 (C.D. Cal. 1986) ("although [defendant's] failure to cite BurgerKing
may have resulted in extra work for plaintiff, it did not... result in the motion being
frivolous").
85. See Rule 11 in Transition, supra note 64, at 23; see also Schwarzer, supra note 7,
at 1024 n.56 (rejecting a requirement of causation).
86. See Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 1022 ("addition of the prefiling investigation re-
quirement was a major purpose of the 1983 amendment" and "promises to be its most
effective and meaningful provision").
87. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 933-35 (7th Cir.
1989); Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 1025.
88. Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 1020; see also id. at 1024 (Rule 11 "requir[es] the
filing lawyer to certify that a prefiling investigation indicates that the paper is warranted
by the facts and a good faith legal argument."); Lyle v. Charlie Brown Flying Club, Inc.,
112 F.R.D. 392, 397 (N.D. Ga. 1986) ("The plain meaning of the amended rule is that
every signature... certifies... that the attorney has conducted reasonable inquiry to
assure that the pleading is well grounded in fact, and warranted by existing law or consti-
tutes a good faith argument for a change in the existing law."), rev'd, 822 F.2d 64 (11th
Cir. 1987).
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forms reasonable inquiry into the major component of what is certified.
Thus, Judge Schwarzer cites with approval a case which he describes as
"not ask[ing] whether the claim had a plausible basis, but whether the
plaintiff's attorney had conducted a reasonable prefiling inquiry."8 9
To paraphrase the Rule as requiring attorneys to certify that they have
made a reasonable prefiling inquiry rewrites the Rule.90 Two questions
arise: Is Judge Schwarzer's statement a correct interpretation of the lan-
guage of Rule 11, and does the conclusion he draws from his paraphrase
(that the courts should focus on the prefiling inquiry and not on the mer-
its) conform with the intent of the amenders? 91
The answer to the first question is that Judge Schwarzer's paraphrase
does not conform with the meaning and language of Rule 11.92 The
grammatical structure of the Rule indicates that the content of the certi-
fication is that the paper has factual and legal merit; the prepositional
phrase "to the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry" qualifies that certification, identifying the extent of
the attorney's responsibility to ensure the legal and factual merit of the
paper.93 Moreover, amended Rule 11 expands the old Rule's "there is
good ground to support it" to "it ... is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification or reversal of existing law." This expansion of what is es-
sentially the Rule's definition of a nonfrivolous paper is evidence that the
drafters did not intend to direct the courts' attention away from the mer-
its of the paper, but instead intended to aid the courts by providing a
standard by which to judge the merits.
Nonetheless, Judge Schwarzer is not alone in asserting that Rule 11
directs judges to look exclusively at the prefiling inquiry. The Third Cir-
cuit Task Force on Rule I 1 reached the same conclusion by a somewhat
different route.94 Their study asked not what the attorney is certifying,
but what (and how many) duties this prong of Rule 11 imposes:
Simply stated, the question is whether the... language imposes two
duties or three. It unquestionably imposes a duty of reasonable in-
quiry. It would appear to impose a duty of reflection upon the results
89. Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 1021 (citing Kamen v. AT&T., 791 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.
1986)).
90. In fact, it has been recently proposed that this prong of Rule 11 be amended to
read: "The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer...
that the signer has made a reasonable prefiling inquiry into the facts and the law supporting
it; and that, to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief based on that
inquiry, the paper is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law ...." Nelken,
Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a Middle Ground on Rule 11
Sanctions, 41 Hastings L.J. 383, 407 (1990).
91. There are also practical problems in applying Rule I I under this interpretation.
See infra notes 118-127 and accompanying text.
92. For the language of Rule 11, see supra note 1.
93. See infra notes 112-117 and accompanying text.
94. See Rule II in Transition, supra note 64, at 15-25.
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of that inquiry ("to the best of the signer's knowledge, information and
belief"). Does it also impose a duty to sign a paper only if a reasonably
competent attorney would conclude, after reasonable inquiry, that the
paper "is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of ex-
isting law?"95)
The Third Circuit Task Force concluded that Rule 11 does not require
that the product be well grounded in fact and warranted by law, but that
the language of Rule 11 imposes only two duties-reasonable inquiry and
reflection upon the results of the inquiry in order to arrive at knowledge,
information and belief.96 This conclusion rests on analysis of the lan-
guage of Rule 11, particularly of the words "to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information and belief," the subjective element that the
amenders retained from the old rule:
"[To the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief" fo-
cuses attention on the individual. If the individual's honest conclusion
about the results of an objectively reasonable inquiry had been deemed
irrelevant (or at least not a sufficient defense), one would have expected
the rulemakers to omit references to the individual, providing simply
"that it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law
"97
The Third Circuit Task Force then proposed a reading of Rule 1I that
would have courts focus entirely on "conduct" without addressing the
merits of the paper.98
There are weaknesses in this analysis. First, although it claims to be
analyzing the language of Rule 11, it refuses to look at that language as a
syntactic whole.99 Instead, it takes the separate semantic elements of
Rule 11 ("reasonable inquiry," "knowledge, information, and belief"
and "well grounded in fact and warranted by... law") and examines not
the syntactic connections between them-that is, how the language of the
Rule relates and subordinates them-but rather the logical connections
in the chronological sequence between conduct (the inquiry), belief
95. ML at 15 (emphasis in original). For another view of how many duties Rule I1
imposes, see Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1080 (7th Cir.
1987), cert dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1101 (1988):
The Rule contains several strands. There must be "reasonable inquiry" into
both fact and law; there must be good faith (that is, the paper may not be inter-
posed 'to harass') [the improper purpose clause]; the legal theory must be objec-
tively "warranted by existing law or a good faith argument" for the
modification of existing law; and the lawyer must believe that the complaint is
"well grounded in fact." The attorney filing the complaint or other paper must
satisfy all four requirements.
96. See Rule 11 in Transition, supra note 64, at 15.
97. Id. For a similar conclusion concerning the force of "knowledge, information and
belief," see Elson & Rothschild, supra note 82, at 243.
98. See Rule 11 in Transition, supra note 64, at 20-25. But see id. at 20 ("product is
an appropriate basis for inference about conduct in some cases") (emphasis in original).
99. See R. Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes 46 (1975).
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(which derives from the inquiry), and the product (the paper which is the
end result). This analysis views the process from the perspective of the
lawyer, who first conducts the inquiry, arrives at belief, knowledge and
information, and then produces the paper. From this perspective, the
subjective, individual good faith element ("to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief") is interposed between the inquiry and the paper
and prevents a requirement that the paper derive directly or reasonably
from the inquiry. The individual is there with his individual knowledge,
information and belief, and we cannot rewrite the rule to insert the "rea-
sonably competent attorney" in his stead.co The individual attorney
must believe that the paper is supported by the inquiry; it is not necessary
that a reasonable attorney would believe it. From this the Task Force
concludes that courts are prevented from examining the merits of the
"product" at all under Rule 11.101
Although the Third Circuit Task Force's analysis presents a logical
construction of what the Rule implies happens as a lawyer prepares a
paper, the conclusion does not follow that judges should consider only
the prefiling inquiry, and not the merits of the paper. There is nothing in
the Rule or the Advisory Committee Note to suggest that courts are
meant to decide whether a violation has occurred by an inquiry that fol-
lows chronologically the lawyer's steps in preparing the paper. 02 For a
judge, the chronological order is reversed; the judge meets first with the
paper and from the paper forms an impression as to whether there has
been a reasonable inquiry. 0 3 Therefore, and in light of the emphasis the
language of the Rule places on the paper and its legal and factual ba-
sis, 1 4 it seems sensible that the judicial inquiry begin with the paper.
Two reasons beyond the language of the Rule support the conduct-
oriented approach advanced by Judge Schwarzer and the Task Force.
First, a product-oriented approach generates unpredictability and arbi-
trariness.105 According to Judge Schwarzer, the problem is not just the
100. But see Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 567
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Even the subjective component has objective aspects since, as a matter
of evidence, the judge will rely on what reasonable lawyers would have known or believed
under the circumstances in deciding what this lawyer believed.") Others insert the rea-
sonable attorney in place of the individual attorney without comment. See, e.g.,
Bloomenstein, Developing Standards for the Imposition of Sanctions under Rule 1I of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 Akron L. Rev. 289, 314 (1988) ("the court must
conclude that a reasonable attorney would believe that the case presented a plausible legal
claim").
101. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
102. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Advisory Committee Note, 97 F.R.D. 198, 198-99 (1983).
103. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1989)("[ain objectively frivolous legal position supports an inference that the signer did not do
a reasonable amount of research"); see also Rule 11 in Transition, supra note 64, at 20
(courts draw inferences from product about conduct).
104. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
105. See Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 1015-17. The Third Circuit Task Force observes
that:
[L]aw tends to be, if not indeterminate, then "underdeterminate".... A trial
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difficulty of predicting how judges will react to a particular claim or de-
fense, but the inherent difficulty of defining frivolity and formulating a
standard by which to evaluate the plausibility of legal arguments."' Sec-
ond, an emphasis on the merits of the paper may result in sanctions for
incompetence, rather than misconduct.0 7 The Third Circuit Task Force
concludes that because the purpose of Rule 11 is deterrence, and because
it is impossible to deter stupidity, Rule 11 should focus on conduct. 10  In
response to this last argument, it may be observed that an inadequate
inquiry may also be the result of incompetence, rather than of abusive
carelessness or shirking.'0 9
C. Reasonable Inquiry in the Rule
Other decisions and commentators have set forth other interpretations
of the language of Rule 11 and the function of "reasonable inquiry." It
has been suggested that the purpose of the addition of "reasonable in-
quiry" is to create some flexibility" 0 in the Rule in view of its mandated
sanctions."' Others suggest that the "reasonable inquiry" requirement
was meant to do away with what has been termed the "empty head, pure
heart defense" of the old Rule 11. t12 This view has some historical valid-
ity, since one of the problems perceived in old Rule 1 was its subjective
court espousing a product approach to Rule 11 is free (as free as the law is
underdeterminate) to regard the conclusion as objectively unreasonable ("frivo-
lous"), and if it does so, the court is obligated to impose sanctions.
Rule 11 in Transition, supra note 64, at 18-19.
106. See Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 1016-17.
107. See Rule 11 in Transition, supra note 64, at 19; see also Schwarzer, supra note 7,
at 1018-20 (proper case management by judges can dispose of frivolous claims and de-
fenses quickly; Rule 11 should be used to discourage dilatory and abusive tactics).
108. See Rule 11 in Transition, supra note 64, at 19; Elson & Rothschild, supra note
82, at 245.
109. For a description of the process of characterization an attorney must go through
before and as he researches a legal problem, see K. Ripple, Constitutional Litigation 4-7
(1984) (quoting R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law § 87, at 175 (3d ed. 1977)).
110. See In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Although
... a court must impose a sanction once a violation has been established, the decision
whether there has been a violation is a judgment call. The Rule speaks of "reasonable"
pre-filing inquiry .... "). But see Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 1022 (rejecting suggestion
that "reasonable inquiry" was added to create flexibility).
111. Amended Rule 11 states that "If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court... shall impose.., an appropriate sanction." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added).
112. See Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 851
(1986); Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 692 (5th Cir. 1986); Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835
F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1987); In re Ronco, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 493, 496 (N.D. Ill. 1985); cf
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985) ("subjec-
tive good faith no longer provides the safe harbor it once did"), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 918
(1986). Judge Schwarzer in his earlier article saw the purpose of the reasonable inquiry
requirement as "to eliminate ignorance as an excuse. There is no room for a pure heart,
empty head defense under Rule 11." Schwarzer, supra note 5, at 187.
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good faith standard; because judges were once reluctant to sanction,"'
that standard was in nearly every instance a complete defense to a charge
of frivolousness.114 Because "formed after reasonable inquiry" is an ad-
jectival phrase modifying "knowledge, information, and belief," it makes
sense to believe that the phrase was intended to change or remove this
defense. Still others have suggested that a reasonable inquiry is itself a
defense to the charge of a Rule I I violation, thus "protect[ing] attorneys
who reach reasonable, but erroneous, conclusions about the validity of
their cases" 115 and "ensur[ing] that counsel may take novel innovative
positions."11 6
In fact, the intent of the amenders in adding "reasonable inquiry" to
the Rule was probably a mixture of these things. The Rule seeks to
strike a balance, intending at once to encourage the use of sanctions and
to hedge in their use with protections for innovative pleading and lawy-
erly creativity. 1 7 Thus the Rule may be said to have removed or quali-
fied the good faith defense and replaced it or augmented it with what is
both a new duty and a new defense.
I1. THE APPLICATION OF RULE 11
The interpretations of Rule 11 described above have resulted in the use
of different tests to determine whether a violation has occurred. This
Part discusses some of the practical problems in applying the conduct
approach and the negligence approach. It then proposes a two-step test,
which focuses first on product and then on conduct. This test follows the
interpretation of "reasonable inquiry" as a new defense and a new duty
under Rule 11.
There are practical problems in applying the interpretation of Rule 11
that focuses on the conduct of the attorney. Courts and commentators
have noted that the conduct test may be unpredictable.1 It also con-
sumes judicial time: Because the facts of the prefiling inquiry (how much
time was available to the attorney, how much time was spent, what was
done)" 9 are not usually evident from the paper filed, judges may be
forced to go beyond the briefs or papers filed and inquire into the prefil-
ing investigation. 121 Without briefs or a hearing on the facts of the prefil-
ing investigation, the examination of the prefiling inquiry is no more than
113. See Advisory Committee Note, 97 F.R.D. 198, 198-199 (1983); Schwarzer, supra
note 5, at 183.
114. See Risinger, supra note 7, at 60.
115. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 567 (E.D.N.Y.
1986).
116. Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1989).
117. See Advisory Committee Note, 97 F.R.D. 198, 198-99 (1983).
118. See Rule I1 in Transition, supra note 64, at 18.
119. For factors to determine whether a reasonable prefiling inquiry has taken place,
see Advisory Committee Note, 97 F.RPD. 198, 199 (1983).
120. But see Rule II in Transition, supra note 64, at 22 ("procedural minimalism" not
important advantage in product approach).
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a process of drawing inferences from the paper filed. 12 1
The major problem with the conduct test, however, is that it fails to
acknowledge and to systematize the step the court takes in deciding to
examine the attorney's prefiling investigation. 22 In the normal course of
events, a judge does not look into the reasonableness of the prefiling in-
quiry123 unless something occurs to trigger an examination. 24 Often the
trigger will be a perception, either the judge's or the opposing party's,
that the paper is frivolous'l---not "well grounded in fact" or "warranted
by... law."' 2 6 Thus, although the conduct approach asserts that an
examination of the merits of the paper is not called for under Rule 11, a
court in deciding to examine the prefiling inquiry has often in effect de-
cided that the paper is frivolous without setting forth its reasoning or
making a careful examination of the paper's legal basis. There is also a
danger that examination of the prefiling inquiry may be triggered by the
presiding judge's anger or dislike of a lawyer. 27 To ensure fairness and
121. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1989)
("An objectively frivolous legal position supports an inference that the signer did not do a
reasonable amount of research, but an inference, no matter how impressive, is still no
more than an inference."); Rule 11 in Transition, supra note 64, at 20:
Unless ... a court is prepared to consider representations about conduct and to
find no violation of Rule 11 if the person who signed the paper in question
provides sufficient demonstration of a reasonable pre-filing inquiry and of an
honest (good faith) belief based on that inquiry, that court is doing more than
drawing inferences. It is establishing irrebuttable presumptions.
For examples of courts drawing inferences, see International Shipping Co. v. Hydra Off-
shore, Inc., 875 F.2d 388, 394 (2d Cir.) (Pratt, J., dissenting) (majority upheld sanctions
imposed for failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry because a "cursory review" of a horn-
book would have revealed the jurisdictional defect, while dissent felt that hornbooks sup-
ported sanctioned attorney's position), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 563 (1989); Zadivar v.
City of Los Angeles, 590 F. Supp. 852, 857 (C.D. Cal. 1984) ("cursory reading of the
statutes would indicate to a reasonable person that there is no basis for bringing this
lawsuit"), rev'd, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
122. Cf. M. Freedman, supra note 53, at 81 (discussing the "dangerous power" of the
"decision to investigate" as a matter of prosecutorial discretion).
123. About 250,000 civil cases are filed per year in the federal system, but a March 5,
1987 LEXIS search going back to 1983 found only 700 district court cases discussing
Rule 11 sanctions. See Levin & Sobel, Achieving Balance in the Developing Law of Sanc-
tions, 36 Cath. U.L. Rev. 587, 592 n.24 (1987). Even if the 700 cases available on LEXIS
represent only the "tip of the iceberg," Rule 11 in Transition, supra note 64, at 59, the
vast majority of cases proceed without the question of Rule 11 sanctions being raised.
124. See Mars Steel, 880 F.2d at 934. For example, courts have held that "Shepardiz-
ing" is part of a reasonable prefiling inquiry into law. See Pravic v. U.S. Industries-
Clearing, 109 F.R.D. 620, 623 (E.D. Mich. 1986); Blake v. National Casualty Co., 607 F.
Supp. 189, 191 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 1984). However, unless a failure to shepardize results in
the filing of a paper that relies on an overruled or reversed case, no court will ask whether
the attorney's prefiling inquiry included shepardizing. Cf. Zaldivar v. City of Los Ange-
les, 780 F.2d 823, 830 (9th Cir. 1986) (although Rule 11 requires that every paper be read
by signing attorney, "an obviously meritorious paper will go unchallenged, whether read
or not").
125. See Mars Steel, 880 F.2d at 931-32.
126. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
127. See Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1203 (7th Cir. 1987) (Parsons,
., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Grosberg, Illusion and Reality in Regulating
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consistency in the application of the legal prong of Rule 11, it is impor-
tant to establish some uniform, objective standard for the "trigger." The
conduct test, which moves directly to a consideration of the prefiling in-
quiry without first making clear what provoked the inquiry, lends itself
to unfairness or at least the appearance of unfairness.
Under the negligence theory of Rule 11, courts have worked out a test
which looks first at the prefiling inquiry and then at the merits of the
paper. 128 This bifurcation of the Rule 11 analysis leads to a clear exposi-
tion of the grounds for imposing (or not imposing) sanctions. Continen-
tal Air Lines v. Group Systems International129 provides an example of
the clarity of analysis under this approach when the issue is failure to cite
cases. The Continental decision looked first to see if there had been a
breach of duty-a failure to make a reasonable inquiry:
By any objective standard, the duty of reasonable inquiry on an issue
of constitution law (here, the due process limits of the exertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction) must include, at the least, inquiry to ascertain
whether or not and when the United States Supreme Court has ruled
on the issue. Here, the Supreme Court had spoken on the issue four
months before the motion was filed. Burger King received at least the
average amount of attention a Supreme Court opinion receives, Le., it
was widely reported by the legal press. It was old enough to have been
printed in the advance sheets. Counsel fell below the required stan-
dard of reasonable inquiry in not knowing of the existence of Burger
King.130
However, the court did not stop after determining that a reasonable in-
quiry did not take place:
That determination, however, does not end the inquiry. Rule 11 re-
quires "causation," i , that the failure to make a reasonable inquiry
result in the filing of a frivolous motion. There is no such nexus here
... Essentially, the same arguments were available-and were made-
by the defendant's reliance on pre-Burger King Ninth Circuit
authority.131
Lawyer Performance: Rethinking Rule 11, 32 Vill. L. Rev. 575, 633 (1987); Note, supra
note 39, at 650 n.101; cf. M. Freedman, supra note 53, at 81 (1975) (quoting Justice
Robert Jackson) (danger of prosecutorial discretion is that it allows prosecutor to "pick
the people he thinks he should get rather than pick cases that need to be prosecuted," and
a prosecutor "stands a fair chance of pinning at least a technical violation on almost
anyone."). One practicing attorney commented:
[W]hy should I, representing a plaintiff filing a lawsuit, be subjected to the va-
garies of judges, some of whom can be very arbitrary and, believe it or not, not
very clever. Many judges, like it or not, don't know what is going on and a lot
of them have deep-seated biases and are out to get particular lawyers. And boy,
Rule 11 is some tool to do it with.
Weiss, A Practitioner's Commentary on the Actual Use ofAmended Rule 11., 54 Fordham
L. Rev. 23, 26 (1985)
128. See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
129. 109 F.R.D. 594 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
130. Id. at 597 (footnotes omitted).
131. Id; see also Whittington v. Ohio River Co., 115 F.R.D. 201, 203-4 n.1 (E.D. Ky.
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This test, however, has the disadvantage of inefficiency. Under this
approach every Rule 11 inquiry will require an examination of the facts
of the prefiling investigation, as well as a determination as to the merits
of the paper. 32 More importantly, this test is flawed by the same prob-
lem encountered in the conduct test: the unacknowledged but significant
step taken by the court in deciding to examine the prefiling inquiry at
a.
13 3
A test is needed that conforms with the language of Rule 11 while
avoiding the flaws and inefficiencies of the conduct and negligence ap-
proaches. This Note proposes a two-step test in line with the interpreta-
tion of the language of Rule 11 that sees the reasonable inquiry as a
qualification of the extent of the attorney's duty to ensure that what he
certifies under the legal and factual prong of Rule 11 is in fact so. As a
first step, the court should look at the merits of the paper. If it is not
frivolous, the attorney's certification is fulfilled, and there is no violation
of Rule 11.134 If the paper is frivolous, a second step is required: an
examination of the prefiling investigation carried out by the attorney. If
the preffling investigation was not reasonable, then sanctions are in or-
der.135 If the prefiling investigation was reasonable and the paper frivo-
lous, the question arises as to whether the attorney's "knowledge,
information and belief" should be examined.136 Here the Third Circuit
Task Force's analysis is persuasive.' 37  The courts should not require
that the paper be a reasonable result of the inquiry. A reasonable prefil-
ing investigation should provide "sanctuary" from sanctions. To protect
the process by which the law changes, a certain leeway for "absurd" legal
positions is necessary.131 Sanctuary as a result of a reasonable prefiling
investigation, without too strict an examination into the attorney's belief,
will ensure that innovative legal argumentation is not chilled 139 and re-
1987) ("Even if respondents initial investigation did not disclose these facts, the causa-
tive element for Rule 11 sanctions would be missing if the facts were as subsequently
stated in the affidavits."); US Sprint Communications Co. v. Kaczmarek, 121 F.R.D. 414,
417 (D. Kan. 1988) (for Rule 11 sanctions, lack of reasonable inquiry must "cause the
filing of a frivolous pleading, motion, or other paper" (emphasis in original)).
132. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 122-127 and accompanying text.
134. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1538-39 (9th
Cir. 1986).
135. See Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 114 F.R.D.
684, 689 (S.D.N-Y. 1987).
136. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
137. See supra note 97-101 and accompanying text. If the court feels that the attorney
had no belief in the legal position asserted, it is possible that the attorney has violated the
"improper purpose" prong of Rule 11.
138. See Risinger, supra note 7, at 57 ("Today's frivolity may be tomorrow's law, and
the law often grows by an organic process in which a concept is conceived, then derided
as absurd (and clearly not the law) .... then accepted as the law.").
139. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank, N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir.
1989).
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duce the likelihood of satellite litigation."4
Under this test, there remains the question of the standard of frivolity
by which a paper should be judged. In other words, it becomes necessary
again to confront the issues that arose in Golden Eagle:'4 1 Should failing
to cite a particular case render an otherwise nonfrivolous paper frivo-
lous? Is a paper frivolous if it fails to identify an argument as one for the
extension or modification of law? Need a reasonable argument in sup-
port of a position actually have been made or is it enough that the rea-
sonable argument exist?
Because several years have passed since these issues first arose, it is
worthwhile to reevaluate them in the light of accumulated experience.
First, the hope or expectation of the amenders that after two or three
years of litigation under Rule 11 a coherent Rule 11 practice would de-
velop 142 has not been realized. 43 Interjudge disagreement is as great as
ever.'"4 Second, in spite of the fundamental disagreement as to the
proper use of Rule 11, Rule 11 sanctions are being imposed far more
often than its amenders expected. 45 Third, while it is not clear that Rule
11 is achieving its goal of deterring frivolous and abusive litigation, 46 it
is clear that at least one of the feared ill effects of Rule 11 has eventuated,
namely satellite litigation. 47 As for the other fear--of a chilling effect on
advocacy and the ability of the law to change-there are those who per-
ceive that this has also been realized.148
In view of the judicial discord over Rule 11, the burden of satellite
litigation, and the widespread perception of a negative effect on advo-
cacy, it may well be that it is time for courts to scale back the use of Rule
11 sanctions for legally baseless claims. A more restricted, more modest
Rule 11 could be a more uniform and predictable and thus a more effec-
tive Rule 11.
140. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 918 (1987).
141. See supra notes 12-62 and accompanying text.
142. See Annual Judicial Conference-Second Judicial Circuit of the United States,
101 F.R.D. 161,200 (1984) (remarks of Arthur Miller, reporter of the Advisory Commit-
tee for the Federal Rules) (although lawyers might be carried away for a time, manage-
ment efficiency of district courts would overcome any temporary litigation burden);
Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 31 (1984).
143. See Vairo, supra note 6, at 205; Joseph, The Trouble with Rule 11, A.B.A. J., Aug.
1987, at 89.
144. See Elson & Rothschild, supra note 82, at 246; Shaffer, supra note 2, at 8.
145. See Shaffer, supra note 2, at 2; Vairo, supra note 6, at 195. For the modest expec-
tations of the amenders, see Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur orPhoenix, 69 Minn.
L. Rev. 1, 19 (1984) (amendment of Rule 11 "a modest step").
146. See Grosberg, Illusion and Reality in Regulating Lawyer Performance: Rethink-
ing Rule 11, 32 Vill. L. Rev. 575, 583 (1987); Joseph, supra note 143, at 87-88.
147. See Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 881 F.2d 788, 797 (9th Cir. 1989);
Elson & Rothschild, supra note 82, at 246; Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 1017; Vairo, supra
note 6, at 195.
148. See Whittington v. Ohio River Co., 115 F.R.D. 201, 205 (E.D. Ky. 1987); Shaffer,
supra note 2, at 22; Snyder, supra note 6, at 55 (1985); Vairo, supra note 6, at 200-01.
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One way of scaling back is to follow the Ninth Circuit's restricted defi-
nition of frivolity.149 The Ninth Circuit's restrictive approach to sanc-
tions for legal arguments under Rule 11 is supported by the difficulty of
defining frivolity. 50 The Ninth Circuit's answer to what makes a paper
sanctionable draws a line that avoids the gray area between frivolous and
creative legal arguments.1 5 ' Following it may help transform Rule 11
back from a "fomentor of derivative litigation, a mire for unwary parties
and overzealous courts" to a "protector against frivolous litigation, a
boon to the parties and the courts."'5 2
CONCLUSION
In imposing sanctions under Rule 11 for pleadings, motions and other
papers that are not "warranted by existing law or by a good faith argu-
ment for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law," judges
should examine first the merits of the paper, and then the prefiling in-
quiry conducted by the attorney. In examining the merits of the paper,
courts should follow the lead of the Ninth Circuit in not imposing sanc-
tions for a failure to cite contrary authority or to identify an argument as
one for the extension or modification of law, and in requiring only that a
reasonable argument in support of the paper exist, not that it actually be
made.
Ellen P. Quackenbos
149. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
150. See Risinger, supra note 7, at 58; see also Note, supra note 39, at 652 (sanctions
should be reserved for legal positions that are "unthinkable").
151. See Snyder, supra note 6, at 55.
152. Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1085 (7th Cir. 1987)(Cudahy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1101
(1988).
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